Big Powers’ Preference for Dependent Small States

In international relations theory, it is often observed that great powers benefit from dealing with economically or politically weaker states that are dependent on them. The classic dependency theory, formulated by scholars in the Global South in the 1960s, argues that resources flow from the “periphery” of poor, small, exploited states to the “core” of wealthy states, enriching the latter at the former’s expense[1]. Wealthy nations, according to this theory, actively perpetuate dependence by various means – economic leverage, political influence, media and cultural dominance, finance, and education – to maintain this unequal relationship[2]. In other words, powerful states often prefer a structure where smaller states cannot sustain fully independent economies or defenses, making them reliant on the great powers for investment, security, and access to markets. This structural asymmetry has been noted by economists and political theorists across continents. For example, Latin American economists like Raúl Prebisch argued that underdevelopment in smaller states was a direct result of their dependent role in the world economy – exporting raw materials and cheap labor to industrial powers and importing expensive finished goods, a cycle that hinders their self-sustained growth (Prebisch 1950)[3][4].

From a Marxist perspective, modern imperialism is seen as the “systematic and sustained transfer of surplus value” from small peripheral countries to a handful of dominant countries. Economist Michael Roberts (2023) describes this as “the essence of modern imperialism,” wherein rich nations control the rest of the world through economic exploitation – via foreign investment, credit and debt, and unequal trade[5]. He notes that this exploitation is “sustained and systematic,” with mechanisms like unequal exchange (trade terms favoring the rich), profit repatriation by multinational corporations, exploitation of cheap labor, and forcing developing states into debt[6]. The result is a net flow of wealth from small states to great powers, reinforcing the imbalance. Such analyses indicate a broad consensus among many Global South scholars that great powers prefer arrangements where smaller states remain economically fragile and politically pliable, ensuring they “have to rely on the big powers” (Amin 1976; Frank 1967).

Even in mainstream Western international relations, it is acknowledged that small states are often the “weak part in an asymmetric relationship” (Steinmetz and Wivel 2010) and can become clients or “sphere of influence” dependents of larger states. During the Cold War, for instance, both the United States and the Soviet Union cultivated client states: they provided financial aid or military protection to weaker allied governments, which in turn gave the superpowers access to strategic resources, markets, or military bases[7]. Some dictators of small countries amassed personal fortunes with superpower support, while their nations’ policies and economies were aligned to the patron power’s interests[7]. In exchange for alliance, these leaders received military aid to maintain power, and the superpowers received geopolitical footholds. This reflects an implicit understanding that it can be “better” for a big power if a smaller state remains dependent, since a self-sufficient regional power could pursue its own agenda instead of serving the interests of the great power.

 

Western Exploitation of Smaller Countries

Western powers, including the United States and European colonial successors, have frequently been accused – by both critics in the West and observers in the Global South – of exploiting smaller states economically, militarily, and politically in the post-1970 era. Numerous examples support this view:

• Economic Dependency and Neocolonialism: After formal colonialism ended, Western nations often maintained influence through financial institutions, trade structures, and currency systems that critics say trap smaller states in dependency. For example, France has been cited for its continued economic grip on several francophone African countries. The CFA franc currency system, used by 14 West and Central African nations, is described by analysts as “inherently unequal” and “rooted in exploitative practices” that date back to colonial designs[8][9]. Under this system (in place since the late 1940s), those African states must deposit 50%–70% of their foreign exchange reserves into the French Treasury, and their currencies are pegged to the euro (formerly the French franc). While this guarantees monetary stability, it severely limits the countries’ monetary sovereignty and policy options, effectively outsourcing their economic fate to France[9]. According to a 2022 analysis in the Harvard International Review, this arrangement initially curbed inflation but “traded decreased inflation for limited macroeconomic options,” leaving member states with diminished growth and difficulty reducing poverty[9]. Even decades after independence, French-backed monetary policies have kept these African economies oriented toward serving French and European interests. The same HIR article notes that 11 of the 14 CFA countries are still classified by the UN as among the world’s least-developed countries, with some of the lowest Human Development Index rankings[10] – an outcome critics attribute to a system that “limits industrialization and pushes capital outflows…towards Europe, often France”[10]. In short, the post-colonial economic dependency is seen as a form of ongoing exploitation: France and other wealthy partners benefit from stable currencies and access to African markets/resources, while the African states sacrifice economic autonomy and remain underdeveloped. This dynamic is frequently labeled neocolonialism. In 2019, even a European official, Italy’s deputy PM Luigi Di Maio, accused France of “using the franc currency to exploit its former colonies”** – a charge reflecting how this concern has entered mainstream discourse (Di Maio 2019, cited in Chiweshe 2022).
• Trade and Corporations: Western multinational corporations have also been vehicles of exploitation in smaller states. A famous historical example is the “banana republics” of Central America. Throughout the 20th century (well into the 1970s and 1980s), U.S.-based corporations like United Fruit Company effectively dominated the economies of small countries like Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, controlling land and infrastructure to export cash crops. Chinese state media (Global Times, 2022) – echoing independent historians – recounts that by the 1930s United Fruit “gained control of 42% of Guatemala’s land, was exempt from taxes, and controlled railroads, communications, and banana exports”, essentially operating as “a state within the state.”[11] The result was that these countries’ economies were locked into serving American markets (bananas, coffee, etc.) at the expense of local food security and industrialization. An expert from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences told Global Times that by promoting plantation mono-crops for export, U.S. agencies and firms made those tropical countries “more and more dependent on the US for food”[12][13]. Indeed, under guidance from the World Bank and U.S. advisors in the 1980s, some Latin American governments were encouraged to focus on cash crops for export to the West rather than developing self-sufficient agriculture, creating reliance on importing staples (a phenomenon economist Michael Hudson termed “food imperialism”)[14][15]. Such strategies served the interests of Western consumers and companies but left the smaller states economically vulnerable and unable to diversify – a hallmark of dependency.
• Military and Security Dependence: Western powers have also exploited smaller states’ security needs. During the Cold War and after, the U.S. often supported authoritarian rulers in smaller countries in exchange for strategic alignment – a practice summarized by a notorious saying attributed to FDR: “He may be a son of a bitch, but he’s our son of a bitch.” This realpolitik approach meant Washington propped up numerous client dictators (in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia) who kept their countries open to U.S. business and military presence[16][17]. For instance, the U.S. backed the Shah of Iran, Mobutu in Zaire (DRC), Somoza in Nicaragua, Suharto in Indonesia, Pinochet in Chile, and others, despite their poor human rights records, because they were reliably anti-communist or protected American interests. In many cases, U.S. interventions overthrew popular or democratic leaders in these countries and installed compliant regimes. The CIA’s involvement in the 1953 Iran coup and 1973 Chile coup are classic examples, where democratically elected governments were replaced by pro-U.S. strongmen under the justification of “stability”[17]. Officially, U.S. policymakers claimed stable authoritarian allies would promote economic progress and eventually allow democracy; however, critical scholars argue the real aim was to secure U.S. geopolitical and commercial interests, from oil concessions in Iran to copper mines in Chile[17]. These smaller states, once under U.S.-aligned dictators, often surrendered economic sovereignty – opening markets to American companies, privileging Western investors, and hosting U.S. military bases – effectively trading their autonomy for the patronage of the superpower. A U.S. policy review notes that during the Cold War, both superpowers “gained access to markets … and locations for bases and missile stations” by arming and aiding such regimes[7]. The presence of U.S. military bases in dozens of countries (many of them small or developing states) continues today; as of the 2020s, many host nations of U.S. bases are categorized as authoritarian or dependent governments[16]. This arrangement can be seen as exploitation insofar as the small host country’s policy options (and often a share of its territory) are constrained by the dominant power’s military footprint. For example, tiny Djibouti in East Africa hosts a major U.S. base (Camp Lemonnier) and other foreign bases, and its economy has become reliant on rents from these powers, limiting its ability to chart an independent course. Similarly, several small Gulf states (Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait) depend on the American security umbrella; in return, they offer favorable oil deals, base rights, or political alignment. Such military reliance creates a clientelistic bond: the big power ensures the regime’s survival; the small state advances the big power’s regional interests.
• Political Pressure and Governance: Great powers also exert political influence over smaller states, sometimes undermining their sovereignty. Western governments and institutions have leveraged aid and loans to dictate policy in developing states. In the 1980s and 1990s, the IMF and World Bank imposed Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) on many indebted small economies in Africa, Latin America, and Asia – requiring privatization, austerity, and trade liberalization as loan conditions. While presented as reforms, these policies often benefited Western investors (who could then access local industries and markets) at the expense of local populations, leading to accusations that the IMF acted as an agent of “debt-trap diplomacy” itself[18]. In fact, the term “debt-trap diplomacy” – now often associated with China – was originally also applied to IMF/World Bank practices that led to poor countries surrendering economic control (through privatization of state enterprises, loss of food security, etc.)[18]. Jamaica, for example, underwent IMF programs that gutted its local agriculture and made it more dependent on imported (often American) food – a case famously documented in the film Life and Debt. Likewise, Western political influence appears in how small states vote in international forums: wealthy patrons can sometimes sway the votes of micro-states through aid. It’s often noted that many small Pacific Island or Caribbean nations establish diplomatic relations or vote with Taiwan or China, the US or Cuba, etc., in line with which patron offers more aid – an indicator of how great powers treat their sovereignty as tradable. Western countries have also been accused of meddling in elections or supporting opposition groups in Global South states to install friendly governments. For instance, declassified documents show U.S. funding for anti-government media and organizations in states as diverse as Nicaragua and Iran in attempts to achieve regime change (Smith 2010). Such political subordination ensures the smaller country’s policies remain “in sync” with Western strategic needs, from voting at the UN to aligning on trade and security issues.

It’s important to note that Western narratives often deny that this constitutes “exploitation,” framing it instead as alliance or benevolent support. U.S. officials argue that unlike rival powers, the U.S. ultimately wants small states to flourish and be free, not to control them. For example, a 2018 commentary by James Carafano (a U.S. analyst) asserts “No big power more appreciates small powers. No small state will find a better friend than the United States” and that “great powers, if wise, will support the best hopes of smaller states” rather than dominate them (Carafano 2018). The same piece, however, contrasts this with the behavior of U.S. adversaries, admitting tacitly what many in the Global South say openly: “China and Russia don’t have allies. They have underlings. No country wants to be a suburb of Beijing or Moscow,” Carafano writes[19]. The implication is that the U.S. sees its own influence as more benevolent, whereas it portrays competitors as treating small states like vassals. Nevertheless, even Carafano acknowledges that China and Russia are able to “buy influence” in poor nations with weak governance, because “in poor nations… a little money goes a long way.” This frank observation underscores the common practice of great powers exploiting the vulnerabilities of weaker states – if a small state is economically desperate or institutionally weak, even a relatively small amount of aid, investment, or military support from a big power can translate into outsized leverage over that state’s decisions[20]. Thus, from the Western viewpoint, “malicious influences” must be countered by strengthening small states – but the very need to warn about “underlings” reveals how normal the dynamic of dominance has been in world affairs.

Examples of Western exploitation abound in the contemporary era (1970s–present): The U.S. using private military contractors like Blackwater in Iraq and Afghanistan can be seen as outsourcing exploitation of conflict – these companies operated with impunity in weaker states’ territory, undermining local sovereignty. France’s repeated military interventions in former colonies (from Mali and Côte d’Ivoire in the 2010s back to Comoros or Chad earlier) show a pattern of treating those states as spheres of influence where Paris can dictate outcomes (often to protect French citizens or mining interests). The United Kingdom and other powers have used territories of small states for strategic needs – e.g., the UK’s removal of the Chagossian people from Diego Garcia (an island of Mauritius) in the 1970s to lease it to the U.S. as a base illustrates how a superpower and its ally simply ignored a small nation’s rights for geostrategic gain. Israel’s relationships in the Middle East (though Israel is a regional power, often backed by the U.S.) also reflect this theme: for decades, Israel maintained a “security zone” in South Lebanon (1980s–2000) using a local proxy militia, effectively controlling a strip of its smaller neighbor’s territory. In all these cases, the common principle is structural asymmetry – the stronger power can violate norms or extract concessions, and the smaller state has limited recourse.

 

Non-Western Exploitation of Smaller Countries

The tendency to dominate weaker states is not exclusive to Western powers; non-Western and emerging powers have also engaged in exploitation and dependency relations in contemporary times. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union behaved much like its superpower rival in treating small allies as subordinates. Eastern European countries in the Warsaw Pact (e.g. Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland) had limited sovereignty – when some tried to chart a different course, Moscow intervened militarily (as in Czechoslovakia 1968) or politically. The USSR justified this under the Brezhnev Doctrine, claiming that protecting socialism allowed it to override a satellite state’s autonomy – a clear hierarchical principle. Soviet aid often propped up friendly regimes in Cuba, Angola, Ethiopia, Vietnam, etc., but came with expectations of alignment to Soviet policies. Soviet influence often channeled the economies of those states toward Soviet needs (such as forcing Cuba to specialize in sugar monoculture to send to the USSR, parallel to Western core-periphery trade patterns). In exchange, the smaller states received security or subsidies – a dynamic of dependency. A scholar analyzing Soviet-East European relations in the 1980s described it through dependency theory as well, noting it was a hierarchical exploitation albeit in a socialist context (Klinghoffer 1987).

In the post-Soviet era, Russia (as the USSR’s successor) has continued to exert outsized influence on smaller neighbors. For instance, Belarus and Armenia became economically and militarily reliant on Moscow through unions and defense pacts, which gave the Kremlin leverage to dictate certain policies. Energy dependency has been a key tool: Russia has supplied cut-rate oil and gas to Belarus or Ukraine, and in return expected political loyalty – if a government in Kyiv or Minsk leaned West, Russia would hike prices or cut supplies (as happened in multiple gas disputes). This created an exploitative bind: the small state’s energy sustainability was undermined, forcing compliance. In extreme cases, Russia has encouraged the fragmentation of states to keep them weak: Moldova’s Transnistria region, Georgia’s Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and Ukraine’s Donbas are breakaway regions supported (even garrisoned) by Russia. By sponsoring these micro-entities (essentially “puppet states”), Russia maintains leverage over the host countries, preventing them from full Western integration and ensuring they remain internally divided and thus dependent on Moscow’s goodwill (Kolstø & Blakkisrud 2018). A 2023 article describes such entities as “micro-puppet states… very much controlled by Russian troops, financing and administration” (Ishchenko 2023), illustrating the deliberate use of “smaller than small” states for great-power advantage.

A particularly notorious form of contemporary Russian influence is via private military companies like the Wagner Group. The Wagner Group, a Kremlin-linked mercenary organization, has been active in several weak states – notably in Africa (Central African Republic, Mali, Sudan, Libya) – providing security services to embattled governments in exchange for payment in mining rights, cash, or geopolitical loyalty. Western observers describe this as Russia exploiting conflict-torn states to extract resources and influence. The U.S. Treasury, for example, sanctioned Wagner and noted it “has committed widespread human rights abuses and has exploited and appropriated natural resources across multiple countries in Africa… acting as a proxy military force of the Kremlin.”[21] In Mali, Wagner mercenaries were invited by a coup government; since their 2021 arrival, reports indicate sharp rises in civilian deaths and lucrative gold mining concessions being allocated to Russian interests[22][23]. In the Central African Republic, Wagner guards the president and in return received logging and diamond rights. This “security for resources” swap is a form of exploitation: a big power (Russia) leveraging a small state’s desperate need for security to gain wealth and influence for itself. African analysts have noted that these deals do little to build the host nation’s capacity – “rather than addressing security issues and building local capacity…, Russian mercenaries seek to exploit and extract” (RAND 2022) – potentially leaving the country even more dependent and unstable in the long run.

China has emerged as a new kind of superpower, and many in the West and some in Asia/Africa accuse China of exploiting smaller states through economic means. The most discussed concept is “debt-trap diplomacy,” the idea that China deliberately lends excessive sums to poor countries knowing they cannot repay, so that Beijing can then demand strategic concessions (ports, mineral rights, political alignment) when default looms. This concept gained popularity around 2017 after Indian strategist Brahma Chellaney coined the term. Chellaney (2021) argues that China has “embraced colonial-era practices” by using massive loans as a tool to *“conquer and enslave countries… by debt” rather than direct invasion, becoming the world’s largest official creditor[24]. By “extending huge loans with strings attached to financially vulnerable states,” China boosts its leverage and “ensnares” countries in “sovereignty-eroding debt traps,” he writes[25]. One example in Asia is Laos, a small, impoverished state: in 2020, Laos struggled to repay Chinese loans for infrastructure, and ultimately had to sign over majority control of its national electric grid to a Chinese state-owned company on a 25-year concession[26]. This effectively means a key asset of Laos (its electricity transmission and export network) is under Chinese control – a loss of sovereignty that Chellaney calls a clear victory for Beijing’s strategy[27]. He also highlights Tajikistan, which in 2011 ceded 1,158 km² of territory in the Pamir Mountains to China in exchange for debt forgiveness, and subsequently gave Chinese companies extensive mining rights[28]. Tajikistan, a relatively small economy, has thus yielded both land and resource concessions as it became heavily indebted to China – a process some Tajik opposition figures decry as “quiet colonialism.” Perhaps the most famous case is Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port: Sri Lanka leased the strategic port and 15,000 acres around it to China for 99 years in 2017, after being unable to service the Chinese loans that built the port[29]. Critics cite this as the quintessential example of a debt trap, comparing the 99-year lease to colonial-era treaties[30]. (Chinese officials counter that Sri Lanka’s debt distress was due to other loans and mismanagement, and that the port lease was a mutual commercial deal – the interpretation depends on perspective. Nonetheless, the outcome is China gained control of a port in a small country at a bargain price**.)

Beyond loans, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – a global infrastructure investment program – has drawn scrutiny for how it may create dependency. Even a U.S. ally’s analysis, the Heritage Foundation, noted “Small countries are particularly vulnerable to the malicious effects of China’s BRI”, citing its lack of transparency, associated corruption, and “mounting debt” burdens[31]. A 2021 joint academic study (AidData, Kiel Institute et al.) of 100 Chinese loan contracts found that many contain unusual clauses: confidentiality agreements (keeping the loan terms secret), provisions allowing China to demand immediate repayment or cancel loans if it disagrees with the borrower’s policies, and clauses excluding the debt from collective restructuring (so countries can’t include Chinese debt in Paris Club relief)[32][33]. These legal tools give China tremendous leverage over smaller debtors’ sovereignty and policy choices[34][35]. The study concluded that such terms can “effectively limit the borrower’s policy space” and keep the country dependent on Beijing for any future help[34]. Moreover, China often ties loans to strategic aims: it might finance a project that secures it access to a port, mineral, or market. In Africa, China has invested heavily in resource-rich states; for instance, Zambia (copper producer) owes large debts to Chinese lenders and had to hand partial control of its national electricity company to a Chinese firm when it defaulted on a loan. While Chinese and many African officials deny that China seeks to seize assets (pointing out that, unlike IMF austerity, Chinese loans often fund visible infrastructure), the fear of loss of sovereignty is widespread. The Guardian (2021) reported concerns in Pacific Island nations that “debt-trap diplomacy” could allow China to pressure them into granting military base rights if they cannot repay loans – a prospect that alarms Western strategists and some local leaders. It is worth noting that many Western academics have rejected the most extreme version of the debt-trap narrative, finding that China has not (to date) literally confiscated assets and often writes off or renegotiates loans[36]. Still, the perception remains that China’s enormous economic clout gives it a way to turn small economies into de facto client states. For example, Cambodia has become so financially and politically tied to China (owing over 40% of its external debt to China and receiving massive investments) that it consistently supports Beijing’s positions in ASEAN and the UN, effectively serving as an ally under China’s umbrella (some analysts even call Cambodia a “vassal state” of China in the region). Chinese state media, for its part, contends that Western powers are hypocritical in this discussion – noting that Western-led IMF programs have imposed harsh conditions, whereas China offers an alternative with fewer overt political strings (Global Times 2020). Nonetheless, whether through debt, trade, or sheer economic size, China’s relationships with much smaller economies often exhibit a power imbalance that China can use to its advantage.

Other regional powers have also engaged in exploitative relationships with their smaller neighbors or partners. For example, oil-rich Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE use financial aid and investment to gain leverage in poorer Arab or African states. The UAE has been described as playing a “sub-imperial” role in Africa[37], such as renting ports in Somaliland (a breakaway Somali region) or backing favored militias in Yemen – leveraging its wealth to secure geopolitical footholds while those territories remain weak and divided. Turkey has extended military presence into northern Cyprus, Syria, and Iraq, often justified by security, but effectively controlling slices of those weaker entities. India, a big power in South Asia, has at times been accused of throwing its weight around with smaller neighbors (Nepal, Bhutan, Maldives) – for instance, India’s blockade of Nepal in 2015 pressured Nepal’s government to adjust its constitution, and India’s defense pact with the Kingdom of Bhutan makes Bhutan heavily reliant and effectively guides its foreign policy (Bhutan has no diplomatic ties with China due to Indian guidance). Each of these cases shows a common pattern: the larger state finds it “easier” to achieve its aims when dealing with a smaller state that cannot fully sustain itself either economically or militarily, thereby forcing that small state to seek a patron.

From the perspective of these regional powers, again, this may be framed as mutual benefit or security assistance. But from the smaller state’s perspective (or a neutral perspective), it often looks like exploitation of dependence. As an African proverb popularized in post-colonial discourse says: “When the elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers” – except here, one might add that sometimes the elephant isn’t fighting another, but trampling the grass anyway to get what it wants.

 

“Divide and Rule”: Conspiracy Theories of Deliberate Fragmentation

Beyond documented policies, there are also theories and allegations that great powers intentionally keep states small or fragmented to more easily dominate them. In the Middle East and other regions, many believe in strategies by which larger powers ensure their neighbors remain divided into smaller, weak states. One widely cited example is the Oded Yinon Plan, which is often discussed in Arab and Iranian media as a blueprint for Israel (with alleged US backing) to balkanize the Middle East. Oded Yinon was an Israeli official who in 1982 wrote an article titled “A Strategy for Israel in the 1980s.” In it, Yinon argued that Israel could ensure regional dominance by fragmenting Arab states along ethnic and sectarian lines, breaking them into smaller units that could not unite against Israel[38]. He suggested, for instance, splitting Iraq into three states (Shia, Sunni, Kurdish), dividing Syria by ethnic regions, and encouraging the separation of Lebanon’s factions[39][40]. The goal was explicitly to “prevent the formation of a unified Arab front” by “weakening and breaking up neighboring Arab states,” as summarized in a PressTV (Iran) explainer[38]. Although the Yinon Plan was a theoretical paper, not an official policy, Iranian and pro-Palestinian commentators often cite it as evidence of a real ongoing plot. For example, Iranian state media in 2024 wrote that “the central theme of the Yinon Plan was that Israel could enhance its regional dominance by fostering instability, internal conflict, and the eventual fragmentation of countries in its neighborhood”, and that this strategy has essentially been adopted by Israeli hardliners seeking a “Greater Israel”[38]. They point to current events – Iraq’s past sectarian conflict, Syria’s civil war, Libya’s collapse, Sudan’s partition** – as allegedly reflecting this divide-and-rule strategy (though these events had many internal causes).

Iran’s government officials have openly accused the U.S. and Israel of pursuing such schemes. In December 2024, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi warned of a “long-term plot by the US and Israeli regime aimed at disintegration of regional Muslim countries” to enable Israel’s domination[41]. He cited the wars in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria as evidence, essentially accusing Washington and Tel Aviv of intentionally sowing chaos to break nations apart[42]. This view – prevalent in Iranian and some Arab discourse – is that the big powers (often identified as the US and Israel, sometimes Britain or France historically) prefer smaller, fractured states in the Middle East because they are easier to control, whether for resources or strategic advantage. It’s essentially a conspiracy theory standpoint, since it imputes a coordinated “plan” behind disparate conflicts. Nonetheless, it is important to highlight such perspectives given the question’s emphasis on including theories and even conspiracy theories with sources. The “Yinon Plan” theory is frequently referenced in alternative and Middle Eastern media as a real blueprint: for example, PressTV explains that Yinon “advocated that Israeli strategy…aims to redraw the map of the Middle East, fragment the Arab states, and become a regional superpower”[43][44]. Likewise, commentators talk about a supposed “New Middle East” plan during the 2000s (attributed to U.S. neoconservatives) that envisioned redrawing borders (some point to a 2006 map by retired US Col. Ralph Peters that imagined a partitioned Middle East – though Peters was an analyst, not a policymaker). While most academic experts do not consider these conspiracy theories as literal policy, the fact that such ideas are widely believed indicates a deep-seated understanding in the Global South that large powers often prefer dealing with many weak states rather than one strong state. Historically, this isn’t unfounded – “divide and rule” was a classic imperial tactic (e.g., carving up territories, exploiting ethnic divisions). Critics cite the division of Africa into many small colonies/states and the partition of countries like India, Palestine, or Sudan as having benefitted great power influence.

Another example sometimes raised is the Balkans in the 1990s: Some Serbian and Russian sources argue that Western powers supported the breakup of Yugoslavia not just for humanitarian reasons but to shatter a strong socialist state and replace it with a bunch of smaller, ethnically based states that would be economically and militarily weak. Indeed, after Yugoslavia dissolved, the new small states became aid-dependent and opened up to Western corporations; NATO was able to extend influence (e.g., bases in Kosovo). This aligns with the notion that great powers may find it “better” to handle five or six weak economies than one middle-sized country with its own will. Similarly, in Africa, the secession of resource-rich regions (like South Sudan from Sudan, or the lingering calls for secession in mineral-rich Katanga in Congo in earlier decades) is sometimes viewed through a lens of outside encouragement for easier resource access.

While these “plans” and theories can verge on conspiratorial, they underscore a real phenomenon: whenever a large power has the ability to engage a smaller state one-on-one, the imbalance of power means the larger can extract disproportionate gains. In multilateral settings or if facing a larger, united bloc, the great power has to compromise more. Therefore, it has an interest (strategically or unconsciously) in a world of many small, pliable units. Western, Russian, and Chinese sources each accuse the other of exploiting this principle. A U.S. Army War College paper even noted that small states can sometimes play great powers against each other, but if they fail, they become “chess pieces” in great power games – highlighting the peril of smallness in a world of giants (Stewart 2018).

 

Conclusion

In summary, multiple sources from across political spectrums acknowledge that big powers often find it advantageous to deal with smaller, less self-sustainable states – and there are myriad contemporary examples of economic dependency, military reliance, and political subordination that illustrate this global principle. Western critics (especially from the Global South or leftist traditions) emphasize how the U.S. and European powers maintain neocolonial relationships – through debt, trade, and political influence – that keep many African, Latin American, and Asian states dependent. We saw how French monetary policies in West Africa or American backing of client regimes serve to extract benefits (resources, loyalty, strategic access) from those states[8][17]. Alternative and non-Western media further underline this with strong rhetoric: Chinese state media calls the U.S. a “slavery empire” that “enslaves countries to serve its interests” via the dollar and military power[45][46], citing the banana republics and decades of Latin American exploitation as evidence[11][47]. On the other hand, Western think tanks accuse China and Russia of “buying influence” in weak states to turn them into vassals, pointing to things like BRI debt and Wagner mercenaries as new forms of exploitation[31][21]. Each side highlights the other’s penchant for dominating small nations – and, notably, each uses the treatment of small states as a moral differentiator (e.g., the U.S. claiming it treats small allies as friends, not underlings[19]). The reality illustrated by all these sources is that structural asymmetry – big vs small – inherently lends itself to exploitation, regardless of ideology. Even when couched as “help” or “partnership,” the great power usually ends up with the upper hand.

Since 1970, many newly independent or developing states have discovered that political sovereignty did not guarantee economic independence or security autonomy. They often had to align with a superpower or enter the global market on unequal terms, leading to what Kwame Nkrumah termed “neo-colonialism: the last stage of imperialism.” Whether it’s Western banks dictating austerity in an African capital, or Russian generals brokering a deal in an African jungle, or Chinese contractors building a mega-project that a small nation must repay – the pattern is recognizable. Great powers and their proxies exploit the weaknesses of small states, while small states seek great-power patrons to survive – a mutually reinforcing cycle of dependency. As one Global South economist put it, “The dominant imperialist countries control the rest of the world through economic exploitation…this is the essence of modern imperialism” (Roberts 2023)[5]. And as an Iranian official warned, from his vantage point, “the US and Israel” prefer a fractured neighborhood to an assertive one[41].

Ultimately, the question of whether big powers “prefer” smaller, unsustainable states might be answered by paraphrasing an old saying: great powers don’t have friends, they have interests – and it can be in their interest that you stay small. The evidence and cases above, drawn from Western and non-Western sources, mainstream and alternative narratives, all point to the conclusion that where there is structural asymmetry, there is potential for exploitation. Smaller states that cannot stand on their own economically or militarily often become arenas for great-power competition or tools for great-power gain. Whether one labels it imperialism, dependency, clientelism, or partnership is largely a matter of perspective – but the underlying power imbalance is a constant of contemporary geopolitics.

Sources:

·       Carafano, James Jay. 2018. “Why Small States Matter to Big Powers.” The National Interest/Heritage Foundation (August 11, 2018)[19][31].

·       “Dependency Theory.” n.d. Wikipedia (accessed 2025)[1][2].

·       Harvard International Review. 2022. “True Sovereignty? The CFA Franc and French Influence in Africa.” (March 18, 2022)[8][9].

·       Roberts, Michael. 2023. “How rich nations continue to systematically exploit the Global South.” Green Left Weekly (Interview, October 18, 2023)[5][48].

·       “U.S. Policy Towards Authoritarianism.” n.d. Wikipedia (accessed 2025)[17][7].

·       Global Times (GT Staff reporters). 2022. “Indentured by hegemony – US builds slavery empire by exploiting other countries.” Global Times (China) (July 6, 2022)[45][11].

·       U.S. Department of the Treasury. 2023. “Treasury Targets Malian Officials Facilitating Wagner Group.” (Press Release, July 24, 2023)[21][22].

·       Chellaney, Brahma. 2021. “Colonization by other means: China’s debt-trap diplomacy.” The Hill / Chellaney.net (May 15, 2021)[25][28].

·       Press TV (Alireza Akbari). 2024. “Smotrich’s ‘Greater Israel’ fantasy rooted in…Zionism.” PressTV (Iran) (October 13, 2024)[38][39].

·       Press TV. 2024. “US, Israel after partitioning Muslim states to advance Tel Aviv’s regional domination: Iran.” PressTV (December 20, 2024)[41][42].

 

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https://www.greenleft.org.au/content/how-rich-nations-continue-systematically-exploit-global-south

[7] [16] [17] U.S. policy towards authoritarianism – Wikipedia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._policy_towards_authoritarianism

[8] [9] [10] True Sovereignty? The CFA Franc and French Influence in West and Central Africa

https://hir.harvard.edu/true-sovereignty-the-cfa-franc-and-french-influence-in-west-and-central-africa/

[11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [45] [46] [47] Indentured by hegemony – US builds slavery empire by exploiting other countries – Global Times

https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202207/1269931.shtml

[18] [36] Debt-trap diplomacy – Wikipedia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Debt-trap_diplomacy

[19] [20] [31] Why Small States Matter to Big Powers | The Heritage Foundation

https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/why-small-states-matter-big-powers

[21] [22] [23] Treasury Targets Malian Officials Facilitating Wagner Group | U.S. Department of the Treasury

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1645

[24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [32] [33] [34] [35]  Colonization by other means: China’s debt-trap diplomacy | Stagecraft and Statecraft

https://chellaney.net/2021/05/15/colonization-by-other-means-chinas-debt-trap-diplomacy/

[37] The emerging sub-imperial role of the United Arab Emirates in Africa

https://www.tni.org/en/article/the-emerging-sub-imperial-role-of-the-united-arab-emirates-in-africa

[38] [39] [40] [43] [44] Smotrich’s ‘Greater Israel’ fantasy rooted in Theodor Herzl’s Zionism

https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2024/10/13/735158/Israeli-minister-exposes-Israel%E2%80%99s-expansionist-agenda

[41] [42] US, Israel after partitioning Muslim states to advance Tel Aviv’s regional domination: Iran

https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2024/12/20/739417/Iran-warning-United-States-Israel-plot-region-Muslim-countries-Gaza-Lebanon-Syria-war-genocide-terrorism

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